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1 The Rise and Fall of the Socratic 
Problem 
The Socratic problem has quite a history, and is now perhaps only a 
part of history, since its desperately unsolvable nature does not seem to 
guarantee it much of a future. It would undoubtedly be presumptuous 
to claim that the Socratic problem is a closed issue simply because it 
is not amenable to a satisfactory solution, but it is certainly useful to 
identify the principal obstacles and pitfalls that render the discovery of 
a solution improbable, or even impossible. 
Socrates, as we know, wrote nothing. His life and ideas are known 
to us through direct accounts - writings either by contemporaries 
(Aristophanes) or disciples (Plato and Xenophon) - and through indi-
rect accounts, the most important of which is the one written by 
Aristotle, who was born fifteen years after Socrates' death (399). 
Because these accounts vary greatly from one another, the question 
arises as to whether it is possible to reconstruct the life and - more 
importantly - the ideas of the historical Socrates on the basis of one, 
several, or all of these accounts. The "Socratic problem" refers to the 
historical and methodological problem that historians confront when 
they attempt to reconstruct the philosophical doctrines of the histori-
cal Socrates. Any future stance on the Socratic problem, if it is to be an 
informed and well-grounded one, presupposes a full understanding of 
the origins and consequences of the proposed solutions of the last two 
centuries.1 
Translated from the French by Melissa Bailar. 
1 Reviewing all attempts at a solution would be tedious and useless. I will 
limit myself to those studies I find to be the most representative or the 
most significant. For an excellent overview of the literature on the Socratic 
problem, see Patzer 1987, pp. 1-40. Montuori 1992 pulled together a very 
useful anthology of the principal texts on the Socratic problem. 
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I . THE GENESIS: SCHLEIERMACHER AND 
THE CRITIQUE OF XENOPHON 
According to the unanimous opinion of historians,2 the text that 
contributed the most to the development of the Socratic problem is 
Schleiermacher's study entitled "The Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher" 
(1818).3 Although certain passages from this seminal work of Socratic 
studies are often cited, Schleiermacher's work remains largely unappre-
ciated. This lack of recognition is counterproductive because scholars 
attempting to solve the Socratic problem are often unaware that they 
are relying on arguments rooted in Schleiermacher that do not stand up 
to critical analysis.4 
Schleiermacher starts from the observation that there is a contra-
diction between the importance of the new beginning attributed to 
Socrates in the history of Greek philosophy, on the one hand, and the 
banality of typical representations of Socrates, on the other. According 
to the latter, Socrates was occupied exclusively with moral questions, 
concerned himself above all with bettering his disciples, questioned his 
interlocutors on the best type of life available to mankind, and so on. If 
Socrates' contribution to philosophy were limited to questions of this 
sort, we would no longer have any reason, according to Schleiermacher, 
to see in him the man who was the inspiration for a sort of second birth 
of Greek philosophy. Schleiermacher thus rejects in their entirety the 
principal characteristics that constituted the traditional representation 
of Socrates the "philosopher" at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Because until then scholars had turned primarily to Xenophon to deter-
mine the content of the historical Socrates' ideas,5 it is hardly surprising 
that Schleiermacher distanced himself from Xenophon's account. In fact, 
he criticized the author of the Memorabilia on two points: 
(a) Xenophon was not a philosopher, but rather a soldier and politi-
cian, and was thus not the most qualified witness to give a faithful 
account of Socrates' principal philosophical positions (1818: 56 = 
1879:10). Schleiermacher's criticism presupposes that philosophy 
2 See Magalhäes-Vilhena 1952, pp. 131, 138, 158, and 186; Montuori 1981a, 
p. 31; 1981b, pp. 7, 9, i i ; 1988, pp. 27-28; Patzer 1987, pp. 9-10. 
3 For the English translation of this text, see Schleiermacher 1879. See also 
Dorion 2001 for an analysis of this text by Schleiermacher. 
4 In this way, Brickhouse and Smith 2000, pp. 38, 42-43, discredit Xenophon's 
account by using two arguments that, although the authors seem unaware 
of it, could already be found in Schleiermacher. 
5 For a study of the importance of Xenophon's accounts before the start of the 
nineteenth century, see Dorion 2000, pp. VIII-XII. 
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is essentially a speculative activity. Thus, since Xenophon's 
Socratic writings are hardly speculative, Schleiermacher natu-
rally concludes that Xenophon was not a philosopher and that he 
did not do justice to Socrates' profound philosophical positions. 
This is in a way an unjust attack on Xenophon, whose admitted 
goal, as he proclaimed at the start of the Memorabilia (1.3.1 and 
1.4.1), was to show how and to what extent Socrates was use-
ful to others and contributed to the bettering of his companions 
through both his example and his words. Are not being useful 
to others and bettering them worthy objectives of a philosophy 
understood as a way of life2. In any case, this criticism received 
great acclaim, and commentators seeking to discredit Xenophon's 
account have used it ever since/ 
(b) Xenophon was so zealous in defending his master against accusa-
tions regarding his subversive teachings that Socrates figures in 
his writings as a representative of the established order and the 
most traditional values. The positions that Xenophon's Socrates 
defends are so conservative and conventional that it is impos-
sible to understand how such a flat and dull philosopher could 
attract, captivate, and maintain the interest of naturally spec-
ulative thinkers, such as Plato and Euclid, the founder of the 
Megarian school. In short, if Socrates had resembled the Socrates 
of Xenophon's writings, he would not have been surrounded by 
such disciples; he would instead have repelled them.7 At the 
start of the twentieth century, Xenophon's detractors followed 
Schleiermacher's lead and pushed his criticism of the apologetic 
nature of Xenophon's Socratic writings even further, saying, for 
example, that Xenophon defended Socrates so well against the 
accusations against him that it is difficult to understand how 
Socrates could possibly have been sentenced to death. (See Burnet 
1914: p. 149; Taylor 1932: p. 22.) 
It is thus clear to Schleiermacher that Socrates must have been more 
than what Xenophon said about him, because if Socrates only amounted 
to his portrait in the Memorabilia, the immense philosophical influ-
ence we attribute to him would be incomprehensible: "And not only 
may Socrates, he must have been more, and there must have been 
more in the back-ground of his speeches, than Xenophon represents." 
(1879:11 = 1818: 57) This harsh judgment is nevertheless belied by texts 
6 See Dorion 2000, pp. XC-XCI, where I provide many references. 
7 Brickhouse and Smith 2000, p. 43, made the same criticism in the same 
terms. 
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and accounts that attest that the Memorabilia exerted a considerable 
influence on the first Stoics.8 But where does Schleiermacher intend 
to find this other dimension of Socrates that is presumably absent in 
Xenophon's text? Schleiermacher intends to find the more philosophi-
cal dimension of Socrates - "philosophical" in the modern and specu-
lative sense of the term - in Plato, of course. But whatever is found in 
Plato should not contradict certain given facts in Xenophon's account 
that are widely recognized as reliable. Schleiermacher states in the form 
of a question his suggested method for reconstructing the philosophical 
content of the historical Socrates' thought: 
The only safe method (Der einzige sichere Weg) seems to be, to inquire: what 
may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without 
however contradicting the strokes of character [Charakterzügen), and the 
practical maxims (Lebensmaximen), which Xenophon distinctly delivers 
as those of Socrates: and what must he have been, to give Plato a right, and 
an inducement, to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? (1879: 14 = 
1818: 59) 
This "method" raises more problems than it can possibly hope to resolve. 
As far as the "practical maxims" or the "rules of life" [Lebensmaximen) 
aie concerned, a single example will suffice to illustrate the pitfalls 
obstructing the application of Schleiermacher's so-called method. Book 
IV, Chapter 5, of the Memorabilia is devoted to the way in which Socrates 
assisted his companions in regulating their behavior. In reading this 
chapter, it appears that self-mastery (enkrateia) is the surest foundation 
for behavior and action. If self-mastery is the sine qua non condition for 
all successful practical activity, it is hardly surprising that Xenophon 
affirms that enkrateia is the foundation of virtue [Memorabilia 1.5.4). 
Must we consider, then, that the principal role attributed to enkrateia 
has the value of a "practical maxim"? If so, Xenophon's account would 
have precedence over Plato's as far as this essential aspect of Socratic 
ethics is concerned. In fact, since Plato's Socrates grants no theo-
retical importance to enkrateia - the term enkrateia is not found in 
Plato's first dialogues, and the idea that moderation (sôphrosunê) is in 
any sense reducible to enkrateia is also not found in the Charmides -
and because he attributes to knowledge the role that Xenophon attri-
butes to enkrateia, his position appears irreconcilable with a practical 
maxim defended by Xenophon's Socrates and must, in accordance with 
Schleiermacher's method, be sacrificed. As can be seen, this "method" 
leads to results that are at times contrary to those that Schleiermacher 
8 See D.L. 7.2; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.92-101; Long 
1988, pp. 162-163; Dorion 2000, p. 33 n. 231. 
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had anticipated. The difficulties raised by this method notwithstanding, 
it did exert exceptional programmatic influence in as much as it defined 
the program of research followed by several generations of philosophers 
in their attempt to determine the philosophical content of the histori-
cal Socrates' thought. Schleiermacher's method enjoyed a considerable 
success, as is demonstrated by the very large number of historians who 
adhere to or refer to it.9 
After a considerable time, Schleiermacher's essay eventually led to 
the full rejection of Xenophon's account. The critical movement he ini-
tiated grew over the course of the nineteenth century, and reached its 
height in 1915 when Xenophon's Socratic writings had become com-
pletely discredited. To Schleiermacher's two criticisms, nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century historians added eight others.10 Nearly a 
century after Schleiermacher's seminal article and in the space of only a 
fewyears, scholars in France (Robin 1910); England (Taylor 1911; Burnet 
1911 and 1914 ); and Germany (Maier 1913 ) published in rapid succession 
and completely independently from one another studies that were so 
critical of Xenophon's Socratic writings that it was no longer clear what 
merit could possibly be attributed to the author of the Memorabilia. 
The consensus that emerged during this period is neither accidental 
nor a coincidence, and in fact represents the end result of the move-
ment launched by Schleiermacher a century earlier. From there, it was 
only a small step to claim that Xenophon is completely worthless to us, 
as Taylor and Burnet did,11 and that the historical Socrates completely 
corresponded to Plato's Socrates. Burnet and Taylor's position thus 
seems to be the culmination and logical conclusion of Schleiermacher's 
attack on Xenophon's Socratic writings at the start of the nineteenth 
century. Even if it is generally agreed that Burnet and Taylor's thesis is 
too extreme, and that Plato's Socrates cannot be simply equated with 
the historical Socrates, twentieth-century scholarship has in a sense 
endorsed their work by ostracizing Xenophon's Socrates and by deem-
ing Plato's Socrates the only one worthy of any interest whatsoever." 
Although the historical development of the Socratic problem has been 
9 See the numerous references given by Dorion 2000, p. XIII, n. 2. 
10 For a detailed presentation of these critiques, see Dorion 2000, pp. XVII-XCIX. 
11 See Burnet 1914, p. 150: "It is really impossible to preserve Xenophon's 
Sokrates, even if he were worth preserving." 
12 See, among others, Vlastos 1971, p. 2: Plato's Socrates is "in fact the only 
Socrates worth talking about"; Santas 1979, p. X: "It is only Plato's Socrates 
that is of major interest to the contemporary philosopher"; Kahn 1981, 
p. 319: "As far as we are concerned, the Socrates of the dialogues [i.e. Plato's] 
is the historical Socrates. He is certainly the only one who counts for the 
history of philosophy." 
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far from linear, the overwhelming majority of the scholarly work dat-
ing from the beginnings of the Socratic problem until 1915 completely 
reversed the prevailing situation of 1815 against which Schleiermacher 
rebelled, to the benefit of Plato. If the disgrace that Xenophon's Socratic 
writings suffered were the immediate consequence of the birth and 
development of the Socratic problem, in contrast, the recent renewal of 
interest in them is largely due to the decline of this problem. 
2. THE IMPASSE AND THE FALL: THE FICTIONAL 
NATURE OF THE LOGOI SOKRATIKOI 
The nearly unanimous discredit that befell Xenophon's Socratic writ-
ings nonetheless did not bring about a solution to the Socratic problem. 
Historians continued to debate the value of the three other sources, 
with the majority of them giving priority to Plato, others to Aristotle,13 
and a final few to Aristophanes.14 In short, if everyone, or nearly every-
one, agreed to reject Xenophon's accounts, no one was in agreement 
over the respective reliability of the three other sources. It is proba-
bly impossible to reconstruct the ideas of the historical Socrates from 
Aristophanes' The Clouds, not only because the very genre of comedy 
lends itself to exaggeration and even excess, but also because there is 
good reason to believe that Socrates' character in The Clouds is really 
a composite figure whose traits were gathered not only from Socrates 
himself but also from the physiologoi and the sophists.15 The case of 
Plato's account especially highlights the absence of consensus; if we 
consider only those commentators who are inclined to grant priority to 
Plato's dialogues, we notice that they do not turn to the same dialogues 
to reconstruct the historical Socrates' theories. Some rely mostly on the 
Apology,16 many base their work on the entirety of the early dialogues,17 
or on just a few of them, others still call on the apocryphal dialogues,18 
and finally some consider that every word that Plato put in Socrates' 
mouth, whether in an early, middle, or late dialogue, has a place in the 
record of the historical Socrates.19 It is quite surprising that there is 
13 Joël 1893,1, p. 203. 
14 See the numerous references indicated by Montuori 1988, p. 42, n. 36. H. 
Gomperz 1924 went so far as to claim that the historical Socrates was found 
not in The Clouds but in fragments of other comedies! 
15 See Ross 1933, p. io; Dover 1968, pp. XXXVI, XL; Guthrie 1971, p. 52; Vlastos 
1971, p. 1, n.i and the many authors mentioned by Montuori 1988, p. 41, n.35. 
16 See infra pp. 17-18. 
17 See Maier 1913; Guthrie 1975, p. 67; Vlastos 1991, pp. 45-50; Graham 1992,· 
Brickhouse and Smith 2000, pp. 44-49; 2003, pp. 112-113. 
18 See Tarrant 1938. 
19 This is the position defended by Taylor 1911, p. IX, and Burnet 1911; 1914. 
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no consensus regarding the number and identity of Plato's dialogues 
that would allow for the reconstruction of the historical Socrates' ideas, 
but, in another way, this disagreement among interpreters is inevita-
ble because of the doctrinal heterogeneity of Socrates' character in the 
corpus platonicum.m 
The lack of consensus and the proliferation of attempted solutions 
undoubtedly led to the scholarly works running out of steam, but this 
did not necessarily mean that the Socratic problem was a false prob-
lem to which a solution could never be found. The position that would 
finally evoke a lasting skepticism surrounding the Socratic problem 
was initiated in Germany in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
This major discovery, credited primarily to K. Joël (1895-1896), is that 
of the fictional nature of the logoi sokratikoi. 
The Socratic problem has all the makings of a false problem because 
it rests on a misunderstanding. This in turn entails an inevitable mis-
interpretation of the exact nature of the preserved "testimony" about 
Socrates. For the Socratic problem as it had been debated since the start 
of the nineteenth century to have meaning, the principal direct wit-
nesses (Xenophon and Plato) must have intended to faithfully recon-
struct Socrates' ideas through writings that aimed to transmit at least the 
spirit and content, if not the exact words, of Socrates' dialogues. If this 
had been their intention, we would be justified in asking which account 
best corresponds to the thought of the historical Socrates. Yet every-
thing seems to indicate that neither Xenophon nor Plato set out with the 
intention of faithfully reporting Socrates' ideas. Xenophon's and Plato's 
Socratic writings belong to a literary genre-that of the logos sokratikos, 
which Aristotle21 explicitly recognized and which authorizes by its very 
nature a certain degree of fiction and a great freedom of invention as far 
as the setting and content are concerned, most notably with the ideas 
expressed by the different characters. Yet, since Aristotle sees in the 
logoi sokratikoi a form of mimesis (imitation), would we not be well 
justified in considering them faithful documents that aim to accurately 
reproduce the life and thought of Socrates? This is precisely how Taylor 
interpreted Aristotle's account of the logoi sokratikoi: "Aristotle [...] 
regards the 'Socratic discourse' as a highly realistic kind of composition. 
You cannot, of course, infer that he holds that the actual Socrates must 
have really made every remark ascribed to him in such a discourse, but 
20 Montuori 1981a, p. 225: "It is important to underline that Plato does not 
give us a single image of Socrates, coherent and complete, but a disconcert-
ing plurality of images, all of which have been noted by the critics, who in 
turn have taken one or the other as the most faithful description of the his-
torical person of Sophroniscus's son." See also p. 226. 
21 SeePoeticsi.i447a28-bi3;-Rietoric3.i6.i4i7ai8-2i;fr.72Rose(=Athenaeus 
15.505c). 
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it would not be a proper 'imitation' of Socrates unless it were in all its 
main points a faithful presentation." (1911, p. 55) A lot is at stake in 
the interpretation of Aristotle's testimony, because if the mimesis is 
understood as a faithful imitation of reality, in principle nothing keeps 
us from considering the logoi sokratikoi to be a reliable and privileged 
material aiming to reconstruct the life and thought of Socrates; on the 
other hand, if the mimesis, as Aristotle understands it, is a creation that 
authorizes a degree of fiction and invention, the task of reconstructing 
the thought of Socrates based on the logoi sokratikoi seems doomed 
to fail. According to Joël, then, Aristotle's account establishes that the 
logos sokratikos, classified as a form of mimesis, allows for a substan-
tial amount of fiction and invention, as far as both the setting and the 
ideas expressed by the characters are concerned. The recognition of the 
fictional character of logoi sokratikoi did not immediately gain accep-
tance without debate or controversy.22 It is to Joel's immense credit that 
he brought this essential dimension of logoi sokratikoi to light; it is 
likewise unfortunate that this important discovery is not always cred-
ited to him.23 
Since logoi sokratikoi are literary works in which the author can give 
his imagination free reign, while remaining within the plausible bounds 
of a credible representation of Socrates' ethos, the degree of fiction and 
invention inherent in logoi sokratikoi means they cannot be considered 
as accounts written for their historical accuracy. This does not mean, 
of course, that the logoi sokratikoi contain no single authentic trait 
or accurate detail; but as the historical concern of logoi sokratikoi is 
only incidental, and since we do not have at our disposal the criteria 
that would allow us to separate invention from authenticity, it would 
certainly be more prudent to renounce any hope of finding the "true" 
22 On the debate surrounding the nature and status of the logoi sokratikoi, 
see Deman 1942, pp. 25-33. In the years following the publication of Joel's 
study, numerous commentators agreed with him and recognized the fic-
tional nature of the logoi sokratikoi (see Robin 1910, p. 26; Maier 1913, p. 
27, n.i; Dupréel 1922, pp. 457-460; Magalhâes-Vilhena 1952, pp. 225, 326, 
345, 351, 370, etc.). 
23 Momigliano's works 1971, pp. 46-57, are often cited to justify affirming the 
logoi sokratikoi's fictional nature (see Vlastos 1991, pp. 49, n. 14, 99 n.72; 
Kahn 1992, pp. 237-238; 1996, pp. 33-34; Beversluis 1993, p. 300, n. 14; 
Vander Waerdt 1993, p. 7; 1994, p. 2, n. 6). In fact, searching Momigliano's 
work for a precise argument that attempts to demonstrate the fictional 
character of the logoi sokratikoi is fruitless (see Dorion 2000, pp. CVIII-
CXI). Furthermore, Momigliano never refers to Aristotle's account of the 
logoi sokratikoi, even though it is precisely this account that authorizes 
evaluating the logoi sokratikoi as literary creations. 
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Socrates in these writings. Furthermore, if we consider the fact that 
many of Socrates' disciples wrote logoi sokratikoi,M and that there is 
good reason to believe that the portraits of Socrates differed greatly from 
one author to the next, and sometimes even within the same author's 
writing,25 it is likely that Socrates rapidly became a sort of literary char-
acter (dramatis persona) endowed with his own existence and placed at 
the center of the polemics and rivalries that pitted one Socratic against 
another.26 Each author of logoi sokratikoi in this way created "his own" 
Socrates, whom he contrasted with the competing Socrates' outlined by 
the other Socratics. Each laid claim to, and quarreled over, the heritage 
of their bygone master, as well as faithfulness to his memory and his 
teachings. 
If the logoi sokratikoi cannot be read or interpreted as historical doc-
uments in the strictest sense, but rather as literary and philosophical 
works that include a substantial degree of invention, even concerning 
the ideas expressed, then the Socratic problem seems hopelessly deprived 
of the "documents" from which the elements of a solution could be 
unearthed and the key to the enigma found. If our principal sources 
are already interpretations, we must recognize all that this entails: first, 
we cannot favor one interpretation over another, since nothing justifies 
such a bias on the historical level, and second, attempting to reconcile 
them all would be in vain, because such agreement would be either 
impossible or superficial. It is often impossible because of the many 
insurmountable contradictions in Plato's and Xenophon's accounts.27 It 
is not the case that 
the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues agrees with the versions of Socrates in 
Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aeschines, and also the spurious Platonic dialogues 
(see D. Tarrant 1938), e.g. in practicing the style of refutation known as the 
24 According to Diogenes Laertius, Antisthenes (6.15-18), Aeschines (2.60-63), 
Phaedo (2.105), a nd Euclid (2.108) composed Socratic dialogues. Diogenes 
Laertius (2.121-125) attributes logoi sokratikoi to several other Socratics 
as well (Crito, Simon, Glaucon, Simmias, Cebes), but this evidence should 
be treated with caution. It is generally accepted that Aristippus did not 
compose Socratic dialogues. 
25 I am thinking primarily of Plato, whose representation of Socrates evolved 
so considerably from the early to the middle dialogues that we are really 
dealing with two Socrateses, irreducible and opposed to one another, as 
Vlastos clearly demonstrated (1991, pp. 45-80). 
26 See Gigon 1947, p. 314: "The Socratic literature is primarily self-presentation 
of the Socratics, of their own philosophical thought and their literary 
(dichterisches) abilities." 
27 See the list of the seventeen major contradictions on the philosophical level 
(Dorion 2006, pp. 95-96). This list is not exhaustive. 
IO LOUIS-ANDRE D O R I O N 
elenchus, professing ignorance of major questions, and having a philosophical 
mission. (Graham 1992, p. 143 n.9) 
This claim reveals a significant misunderstanding of Xenophon's 
Socratic texts, for Xenophon's Socrates hardly ever practices the elen-
chus, never acknowledges his ignorance regarding the most important 
questions, and in contrast to Plato's Socrates, never identifies a philo-
sophical mission. And when agreement is possible between Plato and 
Xenophon, it is more often than not superficial. Not only does such 
agreement not necessarily guarantee an objective fact; it is usually 
nothing but a superficial concordance that might mask more funda-
mental discrepancies. There are, of course, many Socratic themes com-
mon to Xenophon and Plato, but such overlapping does not indicate a 
common theory that could be attributed to the historical Socrates. To 
"demonstrate" a fundamental agreement between Plato and Xenophon, 
Luccioni (1953, pp. 48-56) was naïve enough to believe that drawing 
up a list of several dozen common themes (the divine sign, virtue as 
science, piety, self-knowledge, the dialectic, his rejection of the study 
of nature, etc.) would suffice. In fact, it is easy to demonstrate that 
Xenophon's treatment of any one of these themes cannot be assimilated 
with Plato's treatment of it. The differences in the treatment of these 
common themes are so important that the least common denomina-
tor amounts to very little in most cases. For example, self-knowledge 
is a privileged theme in the reflections of both Plato's and Xenophon's 
Socrates, but their respective conceptions of self-knowledge are so dif-
ferent from one another that it is impossible to tease out any features of 
a common theory. Furthermore, the sporadic agreements between Plato 
and Xenophon are not as significant as some might suggest. Take the 
case of the Delphic oracle: both Plato (Apology 2oe-23b) and Xenophon 
(Apology 14-16) certainly attest to it, but this nevertheless does not 
mean that it constituted an actual episode in Socrates' life. In fact, 
there is nothing to say that it is not a myth first invented by Plato and 
later taken up and reinterpreted by Xenophon. It would be a mistake to 
believe that an agreement between two texts allowing the use of fiction 
is indicative of an objective fact (see Joël 1895: 478). Moreover, the exis-
tence and significance of the many differences between these two ver-
sions are not really apparent without an exegetic study that would seek 
to understand them in light of the respective and consistent representa-
tions that Plato and Xenophon created of Socrates and the fundamentals 
of his ethics. The oracle's response in Xenophon's Memorabilia appears 
as a sort of condensed or concentrated version of the ethics defended by 
Socrates, which justifies the claim that, "Xenophon has reformulated 
Plato's account of the oracle's response in the service of his own under-
standing of Socratic ethics." (Vander Waerdt 1994, p. 39) 
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Rather curiously, K. Joël did not explore all of the consequences of 
his valuable discovery. If it is futile to attempt to resolve the Socratic 
problem on the basis of texts that do not aim to faithfully reproduce the 
historical Socrates' teachings, how is it that Joël himself did not give 
up the hope of finding a solution to this problem? This apparent para-
dox is explained by the fact that Joël believed he was in a position to 
resolve the Socratic problem by turning to an account that is not itself 
a logos sokratikos, in this case that of Aristotle (see 1893,1, p. 203). Yet 
if Aristotle's account is not an independent and objective source, as it is 
essentially dependent on Plato's Socratic writings, as Taylor would later 
demonstrate,28 then the Stagirite's account of Socrates cannot provide 
the solution to the Socratic problem. Furthermore, even if Aristotle's 
account at times appears independent of Plato's Socratic writings29 and 
of other logoi sokratikoi, its extremely narrow scope would not allow 
us to progress far at all. What Aristotle has to say about Socrates is 
extremely limited, and in fact his silence on a host of subjects means 
that his account cannot provide the infallible arbitration that Joël had 
hoped for. For example, in regards to Socrates' daimonion, the impor-
tance of enkrateia, his understanding of piety, his conception of the 
elenchus, the nature of his political engagement, his interpretation of 
the statement "know thyself," and his attitude toward the lex talionis, 
all of which are subjects that are irreconcilable in Xenophon's and Plato's 
accounts, Aristotle is of no help because he provides no pertinent infor-
mation. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that Aristotle's 
account of Socrates more often than not has an "ulterior motive," in 
the sense that the Stagirite interpreted Socrates to fit with his own pri-
orities, so that it would be erroneous to consider it an objective and 
impartial account.30 
Let us put all of this in perspective. If we have strong reasons to 
be skeptical of the possibility of resolving the Socratic problem - that 
is, of reconstructing the philosophy of the historical Socrates, just as 
he explained and defended it in front of different audiences in Athens 
during the second half of the fifth century BCE - there are certain facts 
about Socrates of which we have no good reason to be suspicious. First, 
there is information concerning Socrates' biography and appearance. 
28 See Taylor 1911, pp. X, 40-90; 1932, p. 17, n. i ; Burnet 1911, pp. XXIII-XXV. 
29 The source of the passages in the Metaphysics (A 6.987^-6; M 4.1078hl 7-32; 
M 9.io86a37-b5) that attribute the paternity of the theory of intelligible 
forms to Plato and not to Socrates could not possibly be Plato's dialogues. 
This is an important but purely negative piece of information: Socrates did 
not develop the theory of intelligible and separate forms. 
30 This is a common criticism of Aristotle, most notably in Kahn 1992, pp. 
235-239; 1996, pp. 79-87· 
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We know, for example, that Socrates was born in Athens in 470, that 
he came from the deme of Alôpekê, and that he was sentenced to drink 
hemlock after he was judged guilty in 399 of each of the three charges 
that Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon accused him of: corrupting youth, 
introducing new divinities, and not believing in the state gods. On the 
other hand, scholars still debate over the exact reasons underlying and 
motivating the three charges. As far as Socrates' appearance is concerned, 
Plato (Theaetetus 143e) and Xenophon (Symposium 2.19, 5.5-7) do not 
paint a flattering picture: Socrates has a broad nose, bulging eyes, thick 
lips, and a large belly - in short, his physique seems so unappealing that 
his two disciples do not hesitate to compare him to a Silenus.31 Second, 
the textual evidence provides some insight into Socrates' philosophical 
interests. Because Xenophon's and Plato's accounts of Socrates share 
many common themes, it is almost certain that they are Socratic themes 
- that is, philosophical positions that the historical Socrates explained 
and defended. But it is important to remember that we are often forced 
to affirm that Socrates supported one position or another without being 
able to reconstruct with any certainty the full details of these positions, 
because the reasons and arguments that underlie them are often quite 
different if we turn to Plato or to Xenophon. 
Just as several decades passed before the critical movement initiated 
by Schleiermacher's article was carried through to its conclusion, the 
ultimate consequences of Joel's discovery were not reached until the 
first half of the twentieth century. It was a Belgian scholar, E. Dupréel, 
who was the first to adopt a resolutely skeptical position concerning the 
Socratic problem (1922, pp. 398, 412-413, 426). But it was undeniably 
O. Gigon who contributed the most to establish the fact that because 
the Socratic problem was predicated on erroneous assumptions, it was a 
false problem whose solution could not be found. His book on Socrates 
(1947) is a vibrant manifesto in favor of abandoning the Socratic problem 
and a stimulating illustration of another type of research into Socrates 
and the Socratic tradition. If, because of the conventions of the genre, 
Socratic literature always involves an irreducible element of fiction, 
invention, and creativity (Dichtung), then it must be studied in and of 
itself as such. In other words, we should be attentive to the variations 
that we can find among the different versions of a single Socratic theme 
in order to throw light on the significance and the scope of the varia-
tions on the philosophy and the representation of Socrates.32 This is a 
rich field of research that has still not yielded all that it promises.33 
31 See Plato, Symposium 2isa-b; Xenophon, Symposium 4.19, 5.7. 
32 See 1947, pp. 34, 68, and the chapter titled "Die Sokratesdichtung" (pp. 69-178). 
33 If the work of Joël, Dupréel, and Gigon has, in certain respects, become 
dated, it is above all due to the gratuitous hypotheses they constructed in 
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Joel's works allowed us to rediscover in the logoi sokratikoi a truth 
that had already been well known to the Ancients themselves. One of 
the reasons the Ancients never debated the Socratic problem is because 
they fully recognized the fictional nature of the logoi sokratikoi. This is 
demonstrated by the aforementioned passages from Aristotle as well as by 
several anecdotes and accounts expressing a profound skepticism regard-
ing the historicity of the subjects and theories that Socrates expresses 
in the dialogues in which he figures as the protagonist. The following 
anecdote related by Diogenes Laertius is quite instructive: "They say 
that, on hearing Plato read the Lysis, Socrates exclaimed, 'By Heracles, 
what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!' For he has 
included in the dialogue much that Socrates never said." (3.35; trans. 
Hicks) This anecdote is misleading insofar as the composition of the 
Lysis likely occurred after Socrates' death, but, on the other hand, it 
also contains an element of truth in that it fully acknowledges the fic-
tional nature of logoi sokratikoi. Athenaeus (n.507c-d) also recounts 
an amusing anecdote with an analogous meaning. Socrates relates one 
of his dreams: Plato, transformed into a crow, was perched atop his bald 
head, where he hopped about while looking around. To Socrates, this 
dream meant that Plato would tell many lies about him.34 Likewise, 
Cicero (Republic 1.10, 15-16) did not allow himself to be deceived by 
the setting and characters of Plato's dialogues: he was convinced that 
Plato attributed to Socrates theories that were actually of Pythagorean 
origin.35 In addition, the presence of many anachronisms in the logoi 
sokratikoi of Plato, Xenophon, and also Aeschines36 likewise serves 
to demonstrate that the authors of Socratic dialogues treated histori-
cal truth lightly and that their poetic license was probably recognized 
because of the conventions of the genre. Finally, it would be a mistake 
to think that the fictional nature of the literary Socrates was a phenom-
enon posterior to the first dialogues written out by Socrates' disciples, 
because the existence of at least two portraits of Socrates within Plato's 
the framework of "source research" (Quellenforschung). However, a legiti-
mate criticism of the Quellenforschung's excess does not necessarily lead 
to a complete rejection of Joel's accurate and profound intuition that a 
logos sokratikos must be interpreted as a philosophical work in which the 
character named Socrates is often the spokesman of the author's theses and 
arguments, which are themselves in opposition to other theses and argu-
ments that a character named Socrates formulated in other logoi sokratikoi. 
The thesis of fictionality does not necessarily lead to the extreme positions 
of the Quellenforschung. 
See also n.505d-e. 
See also D.L. 2.45,· Proclus in Alcibiades 18.15-19.12 Creuzer. 
On the many instances of historical implausibility in the settings and 
characters of Aeschines' dialogues, see Kahn 1996, pp. 27-28. 
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works confirms that the fictional dimension of Socratic literature dates 
back to its very origins. 
The position of those who recognize the fictional nature of the logoi 
sokratikoi but who nonetheless hope to resolve the Socratic problem is 
methodologically untenable, and raises more problems than it can pos-
sibly solve. Two recent and quite different examples serve as proof that 
we have reached an impasse with the Socratic problem. My first example 
comes from G. Vlastos. Although he recognizes the fictional and creative 
nature of the logoi sokratikoi (1991, pp. 49-50), he believes nonetheless 
in the historicity of the Socrates depicted in Plato's early dialogues ( 19 91, 
pp. 1 n. 2, 53, 81, 90-91, etc.). This position seems at first to be belied 
by another thesis that Vlastos develops in his work-namely, the pres-
ence of two Socrateses - the Socrates of the early dialogues (SocratesE) 
and the Socrates of the middle dialogues (SocratesM) - who uphold dia-
metrically opposed positions on ten specific subjects. In fact, if Plato, 
as Vlastos admits, believed that he was authorized to have SocratesM be 
the spokesman of theses that were actually Platonic, is this not proof 
that the fictional nature of the logoi sokratikoi extends to the content 
of the theories attributed to Socrates? And if Vlastos readily recognizes 
that the ten theses that SocratesM developed are not Socratic, how can 
he be sure that the positions SocratesE expresses belonged to the his-
torical Socrates and are not positions Plato felt authorized to attribute 
to his character of Socrates by virtue of the poetic license allowed by 
the conventions of the literary genre of the logos sokratikos! Vlastos 
himself raises this possibility,37 and his argument against it consists of 
affirming that on several important points, the portrait of SocratesE is 
confirmed and corroborated by Aristotle's and Xenophon's accounts. 
The way in which Vlastos treats Xenophon is rather singular: when 
his account agrees with Plato's, Vlastos is quick to mention it and to 
view it as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the Platonic account (1991, 
pp. 99-106), but when it is irreconcilable with Plato's account, Vlastos 
strives to discredit it by using arguments that are in fact nothing more 
than old biases pulled from the arsenal of objections that Schleiermacher 
and the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century critics of Xenophon 
had already formulated.38 To cast doubt on the strictly philosophical 
37 See 1991, p. 81: "For there is no intrinsic reason why both of these philoso-
phies, despite their polar differences, could not have been Plato's own origi-
nal creations at different periods of his life." See also Graham 1992, p. 144. 
38 Of the ten criticisms regularly directed toward Xenophon, Vlastos draws on 
four - namely, Xenophon was not an actual disciple of Socrates (see 1991, 
p. 103); he was not an eyewitness of the conversations he reports (see 1991, 
pp. 49, n. 14, 99 n.72); he is excessively zealous in his apologetics (see 1988, 
p. 92); he did not have the necessary philosophical aptitude to faithfully 
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value of Xenophon's account, Vlastos strives to highlight supposed con-
tradictions whose very presence in the text of the Memorabilia would, 
he claims, justify a wary attitude toward Xenophon. To choose one 
example, Vlastos suggests this would be the case with the account of 
the impossibility of the weakness of will, or akrasia (1991, pp. 99-101); 
yet it is possible to demonstrate that Xenophon's account is in fact per-
fectly coherent and that its supposed contradictions can actually be 
attributed to errors in Vlastos' interpretation (see Dorion 2003). 
All evidence suggests that Vlastos grossly overestimated the agree-
ment between Xenophon and Plato. Keep in mind that the positions 
that Vlastos examines are the following: ( 1 ) The philosophy of SocratesE 
is exclusively a moral philosophy. (2) SocratesE did not develop a meta-
physical theory of intelligible and separate forms. (3) SocratesE searches 
for knowledge through refutation, and professes over and over that he has 
no knowledge. (4) SocratesE did not develop a tripartite conception of the 
soul, which would have undermined his theory concerning the impos-
sibility of akrasia. According to Vlastos (1991, pp. 99-106), Xenophon's 
account would confirm positions (1), (2), and (3), while its confirmation 
of (4) would be only partial in light of the (supposedly) contradictory 
nature of his account. The agreement between Xenophon and Plato on 
all of these points would thus guarantee the historicity of the positions 
supported by SocratesE. Yet, contrary to what Vlastos claims, Xenophon 
only confirms positions (2) and (4). In fact, although Xenophon's Socrates 
(see Memorabilia 1.1.16) is primarily concerned with questions relating 
to ethics (= 1), he is also interested in religion (see Memorabilia 1.4, 
4.3, 4.6.2-4); education (see Memorabilia 4.1-3, 5-7; Apology 20); and 
art (see Memorabilia 3.10), which are, as Vlastos himself admits (1991, 
p. 48), three of SocratesM's favorite subjects. As far as (3) is concerned, 
Vlastos goes beyond the evidence when he claims (see 1991, p. 105), 
on the basis of Memorabilia 4.4.9, that Xenophon's Socrates recognizes 
his ignorance and seeks knowledge through the elenchus, a claim that 
is unfounded. Xenophon's Socrates never acknowledges his own igno-
rance on the moral level,39 and the elenchus, which he uses in only one 
dialogue,40 offers no assistance in the quest for knowledge but only in 
report Socrates' ideas (see 1991, p. 99). I showed elsewhere that most of 
these objections do not stand up to a careful examination (see Dorion 2000, 
pp. XXII-XXX, XXXIX-LII, LXV-LXX, XC-XCIX, respectively). 
39 Socrates acknowledges his ignorance as far as economics and agriculture are 
concerned (see Oeconomicus 2.11-13), and in those fields where he acknowl-
edges his ignorance, he encourages his interlocutors to seek instruction from a 
competent master (see Memorabilia 1.6.14; 4.7.1). But Socrates certainly never 
views himself as ignorant when it comes to questions pertaining to ethics. 
40 See Memorabilia 4.2 and Dorion 2000, pp. CLXIX-CLXXXII. 
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the revelation of his interlocutor's ignorance. The agreement between 
Xenophon and Plato in the end concerns only points (2) and (4), which 
are purely negative positions: they boil down to stating that Socrates did 
not develop the metaphysical theory of separate forms, nor did he set 
up a tripartite conception of the soul. In brief, this agreement gives us 
absolutely no insight into the content of the historical Socrates' ideas. 
Furthermore, as I stressed earlier, such points of agreement often con-
ceal doctrinal divergences; for example, Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's 
Socrates affirm the impossibility of the weakness of will41 for different 
reasons, and although neither develops a tripartite conception of the 
soul, SocratesE and Xenophon's Socrates do not ascribe the same impor-
tance to the soul at all, since the former equates it to the "self" or to 
the essence of what man is, whereas the latter never suggests such an 
equality and insists just as much on caring for the body as on caring for 
the soul. 
Regarding Aristotle, the vast majority of positions that he attributes 
to Socrates can be traced to Plato's dialogues, so it is difficult to concede 
that Aristotle's account of Socrates constitutes an independent source. 
In suggesting that Aristotle's account is a guarantee of historical accu-
racy because it confirms Plato's account, Vlastos falls prey to a circular 
argument.42 If in fact Aristotle's account has no independent value, 
and Xenophon's does not provide the desired confirmation, Vlastos is 
deprived of the one and only argument that would have allowed him to 
escape from the hypothesis that he himself mentioned - that SocratesE 
is just as much the fruit of Plato's philosophical imagination as is 
SocratesM. 
My second example is taken from C. Kahn. Since he fully recognizes 
the fictional nature of Socratic literature as far as the setting, characters, 
and content are concerned,43 it is hardly surprising that he adopts a reso-
lutely skeptical position: 
41 See Dorion 2003, pp. 662-664. 
42 According to Vlastos 1991, p. 97, n. 69, more than a third of the forty-two 
accounts Deman 1942 selects from Aristotle do not stem from Plato's dia-
logues. Yet the only example Vlastos provides - that Aristotle could not have 
learned that Plato had been Cratylus's student from the dialogues - is not 
very conclusive because it has nothing to do with Socrates. The way in which 
Vlastos uses Aristotle's account was severely criticized by those who, follow-
ing Taylor's lead (1911, pp. 40-90), regard the Stagirite as entirely dependent 
on Plato and thus not an independent source (see Kahn 1992, pp. 235-240; 
1996, pp. 79-87,· Beversluis 1993, pp. 298-301; Vander Waerdt 1994, p. 3, n. 7). 
43 See, among others, 1996, p. 88: "Plato has deliberately given himself almost 
total freedom to imagine both the form and the content of his Socratic 
conversations." 
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Our evidence is such that [...] the philosophy of Socrates himself, as distinct 
from his impact on his followers, does not fall within the reach of historical 
scholarship. In this sense the problem of Socrates must remain without a 
solution. (1992, p. 240) 
[I]t is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Socratic writings to see 
them as aiming at a faithful portrayal of the historical Socrates. [...] the Socratic 
literature, including the dialogues of Plato, represents a genre of imaginative 
fiction, so that [...] these writings cannot be safely used as historical documents. 
(1996, pp. 74-75) 
One would thus th ink tha t the issue was sett led and done wi th : the 
Socratic problem is by definition unsolvable. Yet Kahn almost i m m e -
diately backs away from this conclusion and asserts tha t the Platonic 
Apology is a separate case since it is the text that has the best chance 
of corresponding to a "quasi-historical d o c u m e n t " (1996, p. 88) and a 
"historical account" (1992, p. 257; see also 240 n. 9) of Socrates ' philoso-
phy. This posi t ion is not un ique to Kahn ; numerous commenta tors 4 4 
do not in fact consider the Apology to be a logos sokratikos because 
in it, Plato reports a speech tha t has the s ta tus of a historical event 
witnessed by several hundred people. This would have prevented Plato 
from straying too far from historical accuracy and would have forced 
h i m to recount - if not the exact words - at least the spirit of Socrates ' 
defense before the court . If in fact the Apology were not a work of fic-
t ion like Plato's logoi sokratikoi, it would be possible, at least in theory, 
to reconstruct Socrates ' phi losophy based on the Apology.45 However, 
such a posi t ion is subject to the following objections: 
( 1 ) We have no reason to exempt the Apology from the s tatus of a 
logos sokratikos*6 and to believe tha t it does not contain a degree, 
and perhaps a considerable degree, of fiction.47 The existence of 
44 See Taylor 1932, p. 28; Ross 1933, pp. 15, 22-23; Guthrie 1971, p. 158, n. i ; 
and the references Montuori indicates in 1981a, pp. 42-43. 
45 On the basis of the Apology, which he presents as "our measure for the histor-
ical Socrates" (1996, p. 95 ), Kahn (pp. 88-95) proposes a "minimal view" of the 
historical Socrates. For more recent attempts at reconstructing the historical 
Socrates' ideas on the basis of the Apology, see Döring 1987, 1992, pp. 2-4. 
46 See Joël 1895, p. 480, and Morrison 2000b, p. 239, whose work is a methodi-
cal refutation of those - notably Kahn and Döring (see n.45) - who regard 
the Platonic Apology as a viable "document" for reconstructing the histori-
cal Socrates' philosophy. 
47 Thus it cannot be ruled out that the Delphic Oracle story, which plays a 
fundamental role in the Apology, was invented by Plato to serve as the 
founding myth of Socrates' philosophical mission (see Montuori 1981a, pp. 
57, n. 6 and 8, 140-143; 1988, p. 52 n.81). 
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several Apologies by different authors further confirms that the 
theme of Socrates' trial and defense was no less a subject of rivalry 
among the Socratics than other themes that they debated among 
themselves through the medium of the dialogues (Dorion 2005). 
If the Platonic Apology were a faithful report of Socrates' trial, it 
would then be necessary to deem other rival versions on Socrates' 
trial, including Xenophon's Apology, unfaithful, which brings us 
back to the argument from the heyday of the Socratic problem 
that Plato's account is superior to Xenophon's. Could we in all 
seriousness affirm that the Platonic Apology is a faithful report 
and that the other Apologies are fiction? 
(2) Plato's Apology is a report not only of Socrates' trial, but also of 
the very fundamentals of his philosophy; this implies that the 
supposed faithfulness of the account must cover everything from 
the theories Socrates developed to the actual progression of the 
trial. But because the philosophical positions developed in the 
Apology are also present in other dialogues, it follows that we 
must also consider the philosophical theses of the other dialogues 
that conform to those of the Apology to be historically accurate. 
Yet we have already established that it is impossible to recon-
struct the thinking of the historical Socrates on the basis of the 
logoi sokratikoi, since the very nature of their genre authorizes a 
considerable freedom of invention. If we follow this line of think-
ing through, Kahn's position thus leads to the acceptance of the 
possibility of what it denies at the start. And it follows that since 
Socrates' philosophy, to the extent that we can reconstruct it on 
the basis of the Apology and the early dialogues, differs on several 
points from the philosophy established in Xenophon's Socratic 
writings, Plato's logoi sokratikoi should thus take precedence 
over those of Xenophon, without any possibility of justifying such 
a preference.48 And thus we are yet again mired in the quicksand 
of the Socratic problem. 
3. THE FUTURE OF SOCRATIC STUDIES 
Recognizing the unsolvable nature of the Socratic problem represents 
neither a loss for interpretive studies nor an impoverishment of exe-
gesis; on the contrary, it is an opportunity, an exceptional occasion for 
48 Kahn disqualifies Xenophon's account on the pretext that it relies on 
Plato's dialogues (see 1996, pp. 75-79). However, Kahn greatly exaggerates 
Xenophon's dependence on Plato (see Morrison 2000b, p. 262 n. 42; Dorion 
2000, p. LVIII, n. 2). 
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enriching our understanding of Socratism. In truth, it is the Socratic 
problem that caused an impoverishment of exegesis because a direct 
consequence of limiting the scope of Socratic studies to only the 
Socratic problem was the exclusion of entire sections of accounts relat-
ing to Socrates - in particular Xenophon's Socratic works - under the 
pretext that they did not conform to what were believed to be the his-
torical Socrates' ideas.49 Let us take the recent example of the Delphic 
oracle. The exegetic choices are the following: either we prefer Plato's 
version to Xenophon's for reasons that have more to do with bias than 
the possibility of ruling in favor of one over the other (Vlastos 1991, 
pp. 288-289); or, rather than keeping one and disqualifying the other, 
we conserve both versions and strive to note their differences and most 
importantly interpret them in the framework of the philosophical con-
victions specific to each of the authors (Vander Waerdt 1993). It seems 
quite likely that this type of comparative exegesis, because it revives 
the pertinence of positions hitherto discarded by the Socratic problem, 
will considerably enrich our understanding not only of the reception of 
Socratism but also of the authors who express themselves through the 
intermediary of Socrates. 
If we must abandon the project of faithfully reconstructing the histor-
ical Socrates' ideas, so desperately out of reach, interpreters of Socrates 
and Socratism will certainly have their work cut out,50 since a triple 
task awaits them: 
(1) Analyze each extant logos sokratikos independently in order to 
reconstruct those of Socrates' doctrines that can be teased out 
of its narrative. As far as Plato's Socratic writings are concerned, 
this research, which underwent considerable invigoration follow-
ing the work of Vlastos, is already quite far along. On the other 
hand, Xenophon's Socratic writings and fragments from other 
Socratics are virtually untouched territory. 
49 See Vander Waerdt 1994, p. 4: "An impoverishing, if unsurprising effect of 
the recent scholarly preoccupation with the Platonic Socrates has been the 
exclusion of rival portraits of Socrates from serious study." 
50 In a recent article that attempts to defend "Socratic studies, " Brickhouse and 
Smith 2003 understand this expression in such a way that it designates only 
those works that endeavor to reconstruct the historical Socrates' ideas on 
the basis of Plato's early dialogues. If this is the only object of Socratic stud-
ies, it is hardly surprising that Brickhouse and Smith take to task those who 
challenge the notion that the historical Socrates' ideas can be reconstructed 
because it would deprive Socratic studies, as they understand the term, of its 
sole object and raison d'être. As the reader will shortly see, I understand by 
Socratic studies a far broader and diversified program of study. 
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(2) Pursue comparative studies of the different portraits of Socrates 
left to us by his principal direct and indirect witnesses. In com-
paring and contrasting these different portraits, we will be better 
able to grasp how, and eventually why, a single theme spawned 
multiple interpretations more or less compatible with each 
other. Without going to the extremes of the Quellenforschung, 
we should push the analysis of the common themes in the logoi 
sokratikoi as far as our sources will allow, because it is precisely 
this intertextuality that allows us to grasp an echo of the debates 
that caused such a frenzy in Socratic circles. This exegetic pro-
gram has been very eloquently defended by commentators who 
share our skepticism concerning the possibility of resolving the 
Socratic problem on the basis of the logoi sokratikoi: 
I suggest that this comparative study of the Socratic literature can be a useful 
substitute for that old but ultimately fruitless attempt to define the relationship 
between the Platonic and the historical Socrates. The historical Socrates 
certainly existed, but to a very large extent the fifth-century figure escapes our 
grasp. What we have instead is the literary Socrates of the fourth century, in a 
diversity of portraits. (Kahn 1990, p. 287) 
Plato and Xenophon were not the only authors of Socratic dialogues. Many 
of Socrates' followers contributed to this genre. The conventions of the genre 
seem to have allowed authors considerable freedom to reshape Socrates, idealize 
him, and put their own views in Socrates' mouth. Therefore the cautious and 
reasonable view is that certainty about the historical Socrates is lost to us - and, 
in a way, not very important. The most important fact about Socrates was his 
influence: the extraordinary fertility of his ideas and the moral example he set 
for his followers. (Morrison 2000a, p. 780) 
Some might accuse comparative exegesis of being a sort of literary 
pastime that abandons any aspiration to a historical understanding of 
Socrates' texts and character. We can respond to this objection by point-
ing out that comparative exegesis is rather, on the historical level, the 
most appropriate approach given the nature of the logoi sokratikoi. If 
the various Socratics composed the logoi sokratikoi not only from an 
apologetic perspective but also in order to promote their own respective 
representations of Socrates in opposition to representations put forth by 
other Socratics, only comparative exegesis, freed from the Socratic prob-
lem, is really up to the task of grasping and interpreting the differences 
among the logoi sokratikoi that are, in a way, the very reason for their 
existence and diversity. If the historical Socrates' philosophy is out of 
our reach, the logoi sokratikoi only offer us a "diffraction" of Socrates' 
character and ideas, or, in other words, the different and often conflict-
ing interpretations that his disciples have given of his life and ideas. 
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Only comparative exegesis seems in a position to identify the Socratic 
themes that were the subject of such diffraction and, above all, to give a 
comprehensive account of each divergent interpretation of each theme 
found in the Socratic literature.51 
(3) As for Socrates' posterity within ancient philosophy, we should 
pursue the already numerous studies that attempt to show how, 
on the one hand, the majority of later philosophers (Stoics, 
Academics, Neo-Platonists) appropriated the figure of Socrates, 
and for what reasons, on the other hand, certain others (notably 
the Peripatetics and the Epicureans) were opposed to him. 
Gigon's skepticism has often incited profound hostility, no doubt 
because such a position was feared to lead inevitably to the disappear-
ance of Socrates.52 This fear is unfounded since the type of exegesis that 
Gigon recommended in fact allows for a better evaluation of the actual 
historical breadth of the Socrates' character and his numerous portraits. 
Paradoxically, it is the Socratic problem that leads to a double denial of 
history: by chasing an elusive Socrates hopelessly out of reach, it finds 
only a pseudo-historical Socrates all while ostracizing accounts reput-
edly irreconcilable with this simulacrum of the historical Socrates; by 
doing so, the Socratic problem obstructs a fair historical understanding 
of the efficiency of different representations of Socrates in the history of 
philosophy. Historians of Socrates and Socratism thus have their work 
cut out, and this is why bothering with the useless and cumbersome 
Socratic problem is no longer of interest to them. 
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